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By Christopher Hartwell and Andreas Umland   
 
What should be done about an increasingly aggressive Russia? The past few weeks have 
brought more evidence of Moscow’s move away from international norms and law. From 
continued denials of complicity in the MH17 tragedy and the bombing of a humanitarian 
convoy in Syria to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent exit from the Nuclear Security Pact 
with the US, Russia’s behavior is diverging further from the rules-based consensus of the post-
Cold War world. This is in spite of Western sanctions that were introduced against Moscow in 
2014.   
 
Indeed, these moderate limitations on selling certain goods and services to Russia as well as on 
the freedom of movement of some Russians seem to have emboldened Putin. With a new 
debate underway in the EU and US on the future of the sanctions regime, there may now be a 
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window of opportunity for significantly expanding economic measures, including financial or 
personal sanctions, in order to bring Russia back from the brink of military escalation. The West 
has powerful non-military tools for dealing with a belligerent Russia, given Moscow’s high 
reliance on energy exports. But increased sanctions need to be predicated on a clear metric of 
what they are intended to achieve.  
 
Often discussions of these issues refer to lessons learned from earlier embargoes against other 
countries. What was the relative effectiveness of trade and other limitations in altering political 
behavior? Scholarship such as Gary C. Hufbauer’s classic Economic Sanctions 
Reconsidered or recent work from Bryan Early has shown that economic sanctions have often 
tended to be poorly designed and, as a result, largely futile. Does past experience indicate that 
sanctions are doomed to be ineffectual?  
 
The poor record of earlier sanctions against Iran, North Korea or Cuba are only partly applicable 
to the Russian case. To be sure, Russia is like these countries, a non-democratic state with 
elements of despotism and a large state-controlled sector of the economy. But its economy is 
more deeply integrated into global trade, finance, and investment patterns than many of the 
past targets of sanctions. The Russian elite is heavily Westernized and interacts in a multitude 
of ways with the EU and other countries or allies of the West. About half of the Russian state 
budget consists of income from foreign trade—above all, from revenues related to the export 
of crude oil.   
 
And that makes the Kremlin unusually vulnerable to economic pressure. If the sanctions’ goal is 
inflicting economic damage to make foreign adventurism costlier and thus cause policy 
changes, there are a number of ways in which sanctions could achieve this aim. Unlike the 
sanctions regime currently in place, import rather than export sanctions targeted at the Achilles 
heel of the Russian economy, oil trade, could make a difference and have a quick political 
impact.    
 
The West could, in a first step, reduce Moscow’s state income from energy exports through a 
reduction or outright ban of Russian oil imports. As a second step, it could further increase 
pressure by threatening to also sanction, as the US once did to Iran, non-Western companies 
that buy oil from or transport oil from Russia or that otherwise assist Moscow's energy trade—
that is, a worldwide embargo.   
 
This would have serious repercussions for Russia’s regime. First, in view of the state budget’s 
massive reliance on oil trade revenues, the Kremlin’s available room to maneuver on the 
international stage would be reduced, and make new foreign adventures less likely. Second, 
because of the close relationship between the ruble’s exchange rate and Russian energy trade, 
the country’s entire economy would quickly dive—perhaps even at the mere announcement of 
import sanctions. Third, all economic actors in Moscow, whether Russian or foreign, know of 
the country’s overwhelming energy dependence and fear the above scenario. Not only energy 
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traders but also other businesses would quickly adapt their economic behavior, with likely 
cascading effects like capital outflow, bank runs, or project cancellations.   
 
These measures would not only trigger a major social crisis in Russia because of price hikes. 
They would also eventually strike at the Russian military-industrial complex. Putin cannot afford 
politically to simply cut down pensions, salaries, stipends, and social subsidies in order to 
continue financing his instruments of hybrid war at their current level. This also makes 
sustained Russian counter-sanctions, such as a reduction of natural gas exports to the EU, 
unlikely. Once the Russian state and economy have been hit by Western import sanctions, the 
Kremlin would be unable to further reduce foreign trade income through prolonged counter-
sanctions.   
 
Harming the energy sector would force Moscow to make difficult choices regarding its 
priorities. So far, mainly ordinary Russians have felt the bite of the combined effects of oil price 
slumps and Western export sanctions since 2014. However, certain sectors of the elite have 
been relatively insulated from the effects of these economic changes. With Western energy 
import reductions, insulating elite members of society from income losses would become more 
difficult.   
 
Could such a strategy backfire? The economic turmoil ensuing from such sanctions could 
create, many argue, a Russia even worse than the current version. For instance, Putin could 
become, or be replaced by, a more radically anti-Western and aggressive leader. However, a 
hypothetical Russian fascist regime would still be faced with the challenge of paying basic 
salaries and pensions as well as generating enough income to keep the social system intact. It is 
unlikely that the current regime will be replaced by one even less able to restore trade relations 
with the West and secure critical revenues for Russia’s embattled state budget.  
 
Another open question is what effect these sanctions would have on energy prices globally. 
With the EU still suffering from aftereffects of the global financial crisis, some fear new 
economic disruptions from a Russian-Western trade war. However, one must remember that as 
recently as June 2014, almost six years after Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, Brent oil was at 
$112 per barrel. Only in the past two years oil prices have dropped precipitously due to 
increasing supply because of the shale oil revolution and other technological advances. Given 
the current oversupply of crude oil on the world market and the eagerness of Moscow's 
competitors to replace Russian energy companies in Western markets, the world economic 
repercussions of a reduction of EU oil imports from Siberia will thus be limited.  
 
A more important point for debate is how to properly match future sanctions to desired 
outcomes. There has been insufficient articulation over the past two years of what exactly the 
current modest sanctions are designed to achieve. For instance, the major sanctions introduced 
in summer 2014 were, later on in 2014-2015, linked to the fulfillment of both Minsk 
agreements. Oddly, the prospect of their cancellation or prolongation is thus now also 
connected to those parts of the agreements that refer to Ukraine’s domestic affairs. In the 
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worst case, the current sanctions could be cancelled because Kyiv does not fulfill its obligations 
under the Minsk agreements – although these agreements did not yet exist when the major 
sanctions were introduced in summer 2014.   
 
More generally: Will the goal of the current and new future sanctions be to signal support for 
Kyiv’s European choice, to freeze the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, to deter Moscow from 
aggression elsewhere, to remove Russia from the Donbas, to end the Kremlin’s hybrid war 
against Ukraine, to make Putin hand back Crimea, to halt Russian humanitarian atrocities in 
Syria, or a combination of these – or something else? The so far unclear political rationale, 
underlying philosophy and final objective of the West’s sanctions makes new decisions to 
tighten them difficult. Until now, there is no clear sense of when exactly which sanctions should 
be regarded as having achieved their objectives or when not.    
 
The West has enormous economic leverage against Moscow. But before using it, it must 
properly understand, jointly decide and publicly announce what precisely the sanctions are 
aimed at. Without such clarification, the prolongation of the old and introduction of new 
sanctions may induce more hardship for the Russian people but result in little change in the 
Kremlin’s policies.    
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